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John McDowell‟s conception of perceptual knowledge commits him to the claim that if I 
perceive that P then I am in a position to know that I perceive that P.  In the first part of this 
essay, I present some reasons to be suspicious of this claim – reasons which derive from a 
general argument against „luminosity‟ – and suggest that McDowell can reject this claim, 
whilst holding on to almost all of the rest of his conception of perceptual knowledge, by 
supplementing his existing disjunctive conception of experience with a new disjunctive 
conception of perceiving.  In the second part of the essay, I present some reasons for 
thinking that one‟s justification, in cases of perceptual knowledge, consists not in the fact 
that one perceives that P but in the fact that one perceives such-and-such.  I end by 
suggesting that the disjunctive conception of perceiving should be understood as a 
disjunctive conception of perceiving such-and-such.   
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1.  There is a man in front of me chewing on the end of his pencil.  How I do know this?  
Why, because I see a man in front of me chewing on the end of his pencil.  That is to say, 
I take it that there is a man in front of me doing that, because my (visual) experience 
supplies me with a reason for taking it that this is so, in the shape of the fact that I see a 
man in front of me doing that.  This is a truly excellent reason, for if I see a man in front 
of me doing that then there is a man in front of me doing that.  Consequently, because I 
take it that this is so for this reason, I do not merely take it that this is so, but know that 
this is so – I know that there is a man in front of me, chewing on the end of his pencil. 
 These are seemingly natural thoughts.  But there is an argument – a variant on the 
Argument from Illusion
1
 – which purports to show that they must be rejected.   
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It is possible that I have an experience „just like‟ the experience I have when I see 
a man in front of me chewing on the end of his pencil in a case in which there is no man 
in front of me chewing on the end of his pencil.  In a case like this, I could not see a man 
in front of me doing that, because there would be no man in front of me doing that; at 
best, I could dream of a pencil-chewing man, or have a hallucination of such a man.   
 Here we have two possible cases: a „good‟ case, and a „bad‟ case.  In the good 
case, I see a man in front of me chewing on the end of his pencil.  And let us say that, in 
the bad case, I have a hallucination of a man in front of me doing that.  The experience I 
have in the good case is „just like‟ the experience I have in the bad case.  According to 
this variant on the Argument from Illusion, it follows that the reasons which my 
experience supplies me with must be the same in the good case as they are in the bad 
case.  The fact that I see a man in front of me chewing on the end of his pencil is not a 
reason which my experience can supply me with in the bad case, because in the bad case 
I do not see, but rather have a hallucination of, a man in front of me doing that.  So, 
according to this variant on the Argument, this is not a reason which my experience can 
supply me with in the good case either.  (Just so, the fact I have a hallucination of a man 
in front of me doing that is not a reason which my experience can supply me with in the 
good case, because in the good case I do not have a hallucination of, but rather see, a man 
in front of me doing that.  So, according to this variant on the Argument, this is not a 
reason which my experience can supply me with in the bad case either.)   
 The only reasons which my experience can supply me with are those which are 
neutral between the good case and the bad case, e.g., my experience can only supply me 
with a reason consisting in the fact that I seem to see a man in front of me chewing on his 
pencil.  So, we must abandon the seemingly natural thoughts with which we began.   
 In 1982, John McDowell gave a lecture which sought to rescue these seemingly 
natural thoughts from this variant on the Argument from Illusion (McDowell 1982).  
McDowell pointed out that it does not simply follow, from the fact that my experience in 
the good case is „just like‟ my experience in the bad case, that the reasons which my 
experience supplies me with must be the same in both cases.  Why not say instead that, 
even if my experience in the good case is „just like‟ my experience in the bad case, it can 
still supply me with a reason which my experience in the bad case cannot supply me 
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with, e.g., a reason consisting in the fact that I see a man in front of me chewing on his 
pencil?   
 Expressed differently, McDowell‟s suggestion is that my experience can either 
supply me with a reason consisting in the fact that I see such-and-such, or supply me with 
a reason consisting merely in the fact that I seem to see such-and-such.
2
  That McDowell 
originally expressed his suggestion in the guise of a disjunction is one reason why it has 
come to be known as the disjunctive conception of experience (1982, 386).   
 Since the time of McDowell‟s lecture, interest in the disjunctive conception has 
not merely grown but spiralled – if not quite out of control, at least in several different 
directions.  One way to summarise McDowell‟s position would be to say that, even 
though my experience in the good case is „just like‟ my experience in the bad case, there 
is a fundamental difference between my experiences, in terms of the reasons they can 
supply me with.  The idea of a fundamental difference between experiences which are 
„just like‟ one another is central to recent writings on the disjunctive conception.  
However, McDowell‟s concern with experience‟s capacity to supply me with reasons, 
and therefore with knowledge – which provided the central rationale for his conception – 
is discarded by these recent writings, in favour of a quite different understanding of the 
idea of a fundamental difference between experiences which are „just like‟ one another.   
  The thoughts with which these recent writings begin are harnessed by the 
moniker „naïve realism‟, and maintain that, when I see, e.g., a man in front of me 
chewing on the end of his pencil, what I see partly constitutes my experience itself (so a 
man in front of me chewing on the end of his pencil partly constitutes my experience, in 
this case).
3
  Naïve realism is threatened by a different variant on the Argument from 
Illusion, according to which it follows from the fact that my experience in the good case 
is „just like‟ my experience in the bad case that my experience must be constituted by the 
same things in each case.  In the bad case, my experience cannot be constituted by what I 
see – i.e., by a man in front of me chewing on the end of his pencil – because in the bad 
case I do not see a man in front of me chewing on the end of his pencil.  So, according to 
this variant on the Argument, my experience cannot be constituted by what I see in the 
good case either.  The version of the disjunctive conception which figures in these recent 
writings insists that, on the contrary, my experience in the good case and my experience 
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in the bad case are differently constituted, even though they are „just like‟ one another: 
the former is constituted by what I see, even though the latter is not.     
Expressed differently, and more generally, this version of the disjunctive 
conception insists that my experience is either constituted by what I see – e.g., by a man 
chewing on the end of his pencil – or constituted otherwise.  Once again, there is a 
fundamental difference between the experiences; but the idea of this difference is no 
longer understood in terms of the different reasons which my experiences can supply me 
with.  Because of its concern with the nature of experience, we might refer to this 
conception of experience as the metaphysical disjunctive conception; and because of its 
concern with experience as a source of reasons and knowledge we might refer to 
McDowell‟s conception of experience as the epistemological disjunctive conception.4 
 It is sometimes maintained that whatever constitutes one‟s experience constitutes, 
inter alia, the phenomenology of one‟s experience.  To say that my experience in the 
good case is „just like‟ my experience in the bad case seems to be to say that my 
experience has the same phenomenology in both cases.  What exactly this means is hard 
to pin down.  But one standard way to gloss it is to say that how things seem from my 
point of view is the same in the good case (when I see the man chewing away) as it is in 
the bad case (when I have a hallucination of him doing that).  So, if whatever constitutes 
my experience constitutes its phenomenology, then in claiming that what constitutes my 
experience in the good case is different from what constitutes my experience in the bad 
case, the metaphysical version makes it look as if my experience in the good case must 
differ in phenomenology from my experience in the bad – as if how things seem from my 
point of view when I am in the good case cannot be the same as how things seem from 
my point of view when I am in the bad case.  This might seem to be the beginning of a 
criticism of the metaphysical disjunctive conception.  However, many of its proponents 
insist on this phenomenological difference.  They insist that, in this sense, my experience 
in the good case is not „just like‟ my experience in the bad case.5  But they claim that my 
good experience is „just like‟ my bad experience in a different sense, i.e., in the sense that 
it is not possible to know by introspection alone which experience I am having: whether I 
am having an experience in which I see a man in front of me chewing away, as opposed 
to an experience in which I have a hallucination of such a man.  How things seem from 
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my point of view when I am in the good case is not the same as how things seem from 
my point of view when I am in the bad case.  Nevertheless, introspection alone cannot tell 
me whether the case I am in is good rather than bad.     
 
2.  I have rehearsed (what I take to be) some reasonably familiar material centrally to 
emphasise the differences between McDowell‟s epistemologically inflected project and 
the project of those who endorse the metaphysical disjunctive conception.   
 It seems to be possible to endorse the seemingly natural thoughts which 
McDowell‟s disjunctive conception is designed to protect without taking a view as to the 
merits of „naïve realism‟, whether the latter is advanced as a claim about the 
phenomenology of experience, or merely as a claim about what constitutes experience 
(assuming it is possible to keep claims about what constitutes experience apart from 
claims about what constitutes its phenomenology).  But this essay is concerned neither 
with „naïve realism‟, nor with the metaphysical disjunctive conception.  Its concern is 
with features of McDowell‟s epistemological disjunctive conception which have not yet 
been brought into focus, but which must be central to any assessment of its merits.
6
   
 It is a truth to which philosophers often pay lip service that McDowell agrees with 
Wilfrid Sellars “that knowledge – at least as it is enjoyed by rational animals – is a 
certain sort of standing in the space of reasons” (McDowell 1995, 395) “of justifying and 
being able to justify what one says” (Sellars 1956, 288-9).  But it ought to be stressed7 
that at least part of the point of this Sellarsian doctrine is “to exclude an externalistic view 
of epistemic satisfactoriness, a view according to which one can be entitled to a belief 
without being in a position to know what entitles one to it” (McDowell 2008, 256).  
McDowell‟s central contention is that, if I enjoy perceptual knowledge that P, then not 
only do I have a reason, or a justification, or an entitlement, or a warrant – he tends to use 
the notions of reason, justification, entitlement, and warrant interchangeably
8
 – to believe 
that P, but this reason (or justification, or entitlement, or warrant) does not fall short of 
the fact known (i.e., the fact that P).  And, in most if not all of his writings which deal 
with perceptual knowledge, he assumes that this reason consists in the fact that I perceive 
that P; e.g., in the case of specifically visual perceptual knowledge, in the fact that I see 
that P.
9
  So far I have not made use of the idea of perceiving that P in my presentation of 
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McDowell‟s disjunctive conception, preferring to employ the idea of perceiving such-
and-such – e.g., the idea of seeing a man in front of me chewing on his pencil, rather than 
that of seeing that there is a man in front of me chewing on his pencil.  My reasons for 
this policy will emerge in the sequel.  But, staying with the idea of perceiving that P, it is 
McDowell‟s thought that if I perceive that P, then I am entitled to believe that P, 
precisely by the fact that I perceive that P.  As he puts it, “if one undergoes an experience 
on the “good” side of the disjunction [i.e., if one perceives that things are a certain way] 
that warrants one in believing – indeed presents one with an opportunity to know – that 
things are [this way]” (McDowell 2006a, 234); i.e., if one perceives that P then one is 
warranted in believing that P, and it is precisely that fact – the fact that one perceives that 
P – which warrants one so to believe.  Putting this thought together with McDowell‟s 
anti-externalist, Sellarsian thought that if I am entitled to believe that P then I am in a 
position to know what entitles me to believe that P, we arrive at the claim that, if I 
perceive that P, then I am in a position to know that I perceive that P.
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(McDowell (2003) writes as if he thinks that, if I perceive that P, then not only is 
there a reason for me to believe that P (a reason which consists in the fact that I perceive 
that P), but I have a reason to believe that P (a reason which consists in the fact that I 
perceive that P).  It is plausible to suppose that McDowell considers himself entitled to 
speak in this way precisely by his endorsement of the claim at which we have just 
arrived, because it is plausible to think that I can have a fact as a reason to believe that P 
only if I am in a position to know this fact.) 
For reasons which will become clear as we proceed, McDowell‟s claim that if I 
perceive that P then I am in a position to know that I perceive that P might be described 
as his „luminosity‟ claim.  After clarifying what McDowell‟s luminosity claim does, and 
does not, amount to – by means of a comparison between McDowell‟s epistemological 
writings and some recent work by Sebastian Rödl – I shall suggest that there are reasons 
for McDowell to abandon this claim, and, as a result, reasons for him to abandon one of 
the two thoughts which together entail this claim.  The first of these thoughts (i.e., the 
Sellarsian thought that if I am entitled to believe that P then I am in a position to know 
what entitles me to believe that P) is more fundamental to McDowell‟s overall 
epistemological project than the second thought (i.e., the thought that if I perceive that P 
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then I am entitled to believe that P by the fact that I perceive that P).  So, I shall suggest 
that what McDowell should do is hold on to the first of these thoughts, by rejecting the 
second, and replacing it with a new disjunctive conception, a disjunctive conception of 
perceiving – effectively, a disjunctive conception of (what figures in McDowell‟s 
disjunctive conception of experience as) the good case.  This will enable McDowell to 
avoid the luminosity claim, whilst retaining both the Sellarsian thought and his central 
contention that, if I enjoy perceptual knowledge that P, then I have a reason to believe 
that P which does not fall short of the fact that P.     
However, this new conception will give rise to the question of whether it is 
possible to understand the reason integral to perceptual knowledge as consisting in the 
fact that I perceive such-and-such, rather than in the fact that I perceive that P.  I shall 
suggest that this is indeed possible.  That will take us to a new disjunctive conception of 
perceiving – a disjunctive conception of perceiving such-and-such, rather than a 
disjunctive conception of perceiving that P.
11
  I shall suggest that McDowell has reason 
to endorse this disjunctive conception of perceiving such-and-such.    
 My aim, in this essay, is simply to work through the details of McDowell‟s 
epistemological project, with a view to showing not only that there is an aspect of his 
project he ought to abandon, but also how he can abandon it without unsettling his 
fundamental epistemological commitments.  Because I share many of these 
commitments, the disjunctive conception of perceiving such-and-such at which we will 
eventually arrive is a conception which I think we all ought to endorse.  But I cannot 
argue for this stronger claim here.  In this essay, my aim must be much more limited: to 
argue that, in the light of the commitments which shape his broader epistemological 
project, there are reasons for McDowell to endorse this disjunctive conception. 
 
3.  Perceiving that P puts me in a position to know that P; or, as McDowell sometimes 
puts it – for he uses these notions interchangeably too – it presents me with an 
opportunity to know that P, or, it makes knowledge that P available to me.  McDowell 
wants to allow for cases in which (e.g.) I see that P, but I do not know (visually) that P 
because I do not believe that P.  He offers the following as an example of such a case 
(McDowell 2003):  
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“I thought I was looking at your sweater under one of those lights that make it impossible 
to tell what colours things are, but I now realize I was actually seeing that it was brown.”  
In saying this, one registers that one had, at the relevant past time, an entitlement that one 
did not then realize one had.  One was in a position to acquire a bit of knowledge about 
the world, but because of a misapprehension about the circumstances, one did not avail 
oneself of the opportunity. (158)   
 
Perhaps a (normally) reliable friend has told me that the lights in the room we are in are 
of the sort which make it impossible to tell what colours things are, thereby making it 
reasonable for me both to refuse to believe that I am seeing that your sweater is brown, 
and – because vision is the only relevant source of information available to me – to refuse 
to believe that your sweater is brown; refusals I consequently effect, thereby ensuring that 
I do not know (visually) that your sweater is brown, even though, actually, I was seeing 
that your sweater is brown, and so had the opportunity to know this fact.  And not just 
this fact: I also had the opportunity to know that I was seeing that your sweater is brown, 
but my misapprehension led me not to avail myself of this opportunity.   
 In order to avail myself of the opportunity to know that your sweater is brown – 
an opportunity I have simply in virtue of seeing that your sweater is brown – it is not 
enough for me simply to believe that your sweater is brown; I need to believe that your 
sweater is brown because I see that it is brown, i.e., because of the very thing whose 
being the case puts me in a position to know that your sweater is brown.  And this 
„because‟ is the „because‟ of the species of causal explanation which shows rationality to 
be in operation – as it would not be in operation if I were to believe that your sweater is 
brown in a case in which it is reasonable for me to refuse to believe that your sweater is 
brown.
12 
 (In such a case, I might believe that your sweater is brown because I see that it 
is brown; but this causal explanation would not show rationality to be in operation.)   
According to recent work by Sebastian Rödl (2007), I exercise my fallible 
capacity to know things through perception only if I believe that P because I perceive that 
P – where the „because‟ is the „because‟ of the species of causal explanation which shows 
rationality to be in operation.  In general, a fallible capacity is one whose “exercise is 
liable to be thwarted by unfavourable circumstances” (151). However, the exercise of my 
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fallible capacity to know things is also liable to be thwarted if I am in what Rödl 
(following Andrea Kern (2006, 332-33)) calls “reflectively unfavourable circumstances” 
(154, n. 19) – circumstances which are not unfavourable, but which it is reasonable for 
me to believe are unfavourable.  Circumstances in which the lights make it impossible to 
tell what colours things are by looking count as unfavourable; if I was in those 
circumstances then I could not see that your sweater is brown.  By contrast, 
circumstances in which there is nothing wrong with the lighting, but which it is 
reasonable for me to take to be circumstances in which there is something wrong with the 
lighting, count as reflectively unfavourable; if I was in those circumstances, then even 
though I might see that your sweater is brown, I would – given adequate doxastic 
responsibility on my part, and given that vision is the only relevant information-source 
available – refuse to believe that your sweater is brown, and, consequently, neither 
believe that your sweater is brown because I see that your sweater is brown, nor exercise 
my capacity to get to know the colours of things through visual perception.  
 It is no accident that Rödl‟s work in epistemology is relevant at this juncture 
because its goal is (inter alia) “that of articulating the account of self-consciousness and 
spontaneous knowledge contained in McDowell‟s epistemological writings” (147, n. 11).  
The knowledge that I perceive that P which, according to McDowell, I am at least in a 
position to acquire whenever I perceive that P is, according to Rödl, spontaneous 
knowledge – in contrast to perceptual knowledge that P, which is receptive knowledge.  
Rödl explains the difference between spontaneous and receptive knowledge by saying 
that whereas the latter (e.g., perceptual knowledge that P) is “a distinct reality from its 
object” (140) (in this case, the fact that P), the former (e.g., knowledge that I perceive 
that P) and its object (in this case, the fact that I perceive that P) are “the same reality” 
(145).  He goes on to explain this second form by saying that “if someone bears a 
receptive nexus to an object by which she is in a position to gain [receptive] knowledge 
of it then she knows that she does, and knows it by bearing this nexus to the object” (143-
4).  Perceiving that P is one case of bearing a receptive nexus to an object (i.e., to the fact 
that P) by which I am in a position to gain receptive (specifically, perceptual) knowledge 
of it.  So, it seems that, according to Rödl, if I perceive that P, then I know that I perceive 
that P.  That claim seems to be what Rödl has in mind when he says that my knowledge 
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that I perceive that P is spontaneous, i.e., “the same reality” as its object.  But this claim 
is surely too strong, for a reason we have seen – a reason which Rödl helped us to 
formulate: I might perceive that P but not know that I perceive that P, precisely because I 
am in reflectively unfavourable circumstances.   
McDowell‟s own explanation of knowledge of perceiving that P avoids this last 
claim, because it insists – contra Rödl – that, from the fact that “someone bears a 
receptive nexus to an object by which she is in a position to gain … knowledge of it”, it 
does not follow that “she knows that she does”, merely that she has an opportunity to 
know that she does, an opportunity which she may not avail herself of thanks (e.g.) to her 
being in reflectively unfavourable circumstances.  And in order to avail herself of this 
opportunity – an opportunity she enjoys simply in virtue of perceiving that P – it is, once 
again, not enough that she acquires the associated belief, the belief that she perceives that 
P; she needs to acquire this belief because she perceives that P, i.e., because of the very 
thing whose being the case puts her in a position to know that she perceives that P – 
where this „because‟ is, once again, the „because‟ of that species of causal explanation 
which shows rationality to be in operation.
13
  This is not to deny that, unlike my 
perceptual knowledge that P, my knowledge that I perceive that P is, for McDowell, in 
some sense spontaneous rather than receptive.  The sense in question can be explained by 
saying that whereas the object of spontaneous knowledge (e.g., the fact that I perceive 
that P) suffices to put me in a position to know itself (e.g., to know that I perceive that P), 
the object of receptive knowledge (e.g., the fact that your sweater is brown) does not 
suffice to put me in a position to know itself; to know the latter, I need to bear a receptive 
nexus to the object (e.g., I need to perceive that it is brown).  That is not quite the sense 
Rödl had in mind when he said that spontaneous knowledge and its object are “the same 
reality”.  But is hard to see how they can be “the same reality”, in this sense, by Rödl own 
lights, if I might, e.g., perceive that P but – thanks to the unfortunate fact that I am in 
reflectively unfavourable circumstances – fail to know that I perceive that P.   
However, even though McDowell‟s explanation avoids the worry which Rödl‟s 
explanation gives rise to, it gives rise to a worry of its own; a worry which – I suggest – 
can and should be avoided by embracing a disjunctive conception of perceiving.   
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4.  Consider the following guise of McDowell‟s luminosity claim: if one sees that P, then 
one is in a position to know that one sees that P.  What worries might this claim inspire?   
 One worry is rather naïve.  There might be circumstances in which one sees that P 
even though, were one to believe that P, one‟s belief that P would be only accidentally 
true; e.g., circumstances in which were one to believe that this – what one sees – is a 
barn, one‟s belief would be only accidentally true, because every other barn-like object in 
the vicinity is a façade; in these circumstances, even though one sees that P, one is not in 
a position to know that P, or in a position to know that one sees that P.  For if one was in 
a position to know that P then one would know that P if one were to believe that P 
because one sees that P.
14
  But, in these circumstances, one cannot know that P.  And if 
one was in a position to know that one sees that P, then one would know that one sees 
that P if one were to believe that one sees that P because one sees that P.
15
  But, in these 
circumstances, one cannot know that one sees that P, because if one could know this then 
one could know that P – and in these circumstances, one cannot know that P.   
 The obvious response to this worry – one which is already contained in 
McDowell‟s epistemological writings – is that, in these circumstances, one cannot see 
that P; e.g., one can see a barn, but one cannot see that this is a barn, precisely because, in 
these barn-façade-heavy circumstances, one cannot know that it is a barn (McDowell 
1982, 390, n. 37).  However, one might worry that this response is distorting our 
linguistic practice, so as to fit it into a mould forged by a prior philosophical theory of 
perceptual knowledge.  And if this worry takes hold, the disjunctive conception of 
perceiving can come to the rescue.  According to this conception, cases of perceiving that 
P either supply one with a reason consisting in the fact that one perceives that P, because 
they are cases in which one is in a position to know that one perceives that P, or supply 
one with a reason consisting merely in the fact that one seems to perceive that P, because 
they are cases in which one merely perceives that P, i.e., cases in which, even though one 
perceives that P, one is not in a position to know that one perceives that P.  Were we to 
grant this conception, we would prevent the worry from arising, by allowing for the 
possibility of cases in which one perceives that P but is not in a position to know that one 
perceives that P.  But we would prevent the worry from arising without insisting – as 
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McDowell himself insists – that (e.g.) one simply cannot see that this is a barn, in the 
barn-façade-heavy circumstances.   
 I think there is something to this worry.  But I do not want to place much weight 
on it, in part because I am not sure it merits much weight, but centrally because I think 
there is a more serious worry, which better serves to motivate the disjunctive conception 
of perceiving.
16 
  
 
5.  McDowell‟s luminosity claim is so-called because it is an instance of a general claim 
which has come to be known as luminosity.  And there are reasons to be suspicions of 
luminosity.  These reasons tend to be cast in the form of a rather technical-looking 
argument, but they can be stated quite simply.
17
   
First, let us assume something markedly stronger than the present claim.  Let us 
assume an instance of what we might call „super-luminosity‟, i.e., if one sees that P, then 
one knows that one sees that P – or, more precisely, for any time t, if at t one sees that P 
then at t one knows that one sees that P.  And second, let us assume a certain sort of 
reliability principle for knowledge: for any times t and t+1, where t and t+1 are any two 
times spaced only fractionally – say, one millisecond – apart, if at t one knows that 
something is the case, then at t+1 this very thing is the case; e.g., if at t I know that I see 
that your sweater is brown, then at t+1 I see that your sweater is brown.  Now imagine a 
stretch of time between two intervals, at the beginning of which I see that your sweater is 
brown, but at the end of which I do not (perhaps this is a stretch of time during which 
your sweater is slowly starting to look a different colour, because the lights which make it 
impossible to tell the colours of things are slowly turning on).  And let „ti‟ stand for the 
first interval, „ti+n‟ stand for the second interval, and „ti+1‟, „ti+2‟, „ti+3‟… and so on stand 
for each millisecond of time between these two intervals.  At ti I see that your sweater is 
brown.  Given the super-luminosity claim, at ti I know that I see that your sweater is 
brown.  So, given the reliability principle, at ti+1 I see that your sweater is brown.  And 
given the super-luminosity claim, at ti+1 I know that I see that your sweater is brown.  So, 
given the reliability principle, at ti+2 I see that your sweater is brown.  And given the 
super-luminosity claim, at ti+2 I know that I see that your sweater is brown.  So, given the 
reliability principle, at ti+3 I see that your sweater is brown.  And so on.  The upshot is that 
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at ti+n, I see that your sweater is brown.  But, by hypothesis, at ti+n I do not see that your 
sweater is brown.  As we might put it: the upshot is that I see that your sweater is brown 
during the whole of the relevant stretch of time.  And that is absurd, because by 
hypothesis I do not see that it is brown at the end of the relevant stretch.   
  It seems that either the super-luminosity claim or the reliability principle must be 
relinquished.  Suspicion immediately falls onto the super-luminosity claim, given that it 
is stronger than McDowell‟s luminosity claim, which says only that if one sees that P 
then one is in a position to know that one sees that P – or, more precisely, that for any 
time t, if at t one sees that P then at t one is in a position to know that one sees that P.  But 
it seems that replacing super-luminosity by luminosity will not scotch the absurd upshot.  
This is especially easy to see if we work with the way of understanding the idea of 
being in a position to know which discussions of the anti-luminosity argument tend to 
assume, according to which if I am in a position to know that something is the case, and I 
attend to the question of whether this is the case, then I know that it is the case.  We need 
simply to imagine our stretch of time between two intervals – at the beginning of which I 
see that your sweater is brown, but at the end of which I do not – and to insist that 
throughout all of this stretch of time I am attending to the question of whether I see that 
your sweater is brown.  For now – on the assumption that t is a time during the relevant 
stretch (including the two intervals) – the luminosity claim that, for any time t, if at t I see 
that your sweater is brown then at t I am in a position to know that I see that your sweater 
is brown, will entail the super-luminosity claim that, for any time t, if at t I see that your 
sweater is brown then at t I know that I see that your sweater is brown.  So, it will still 
follow – given the reliability principle – that I see that your sweater is brown during the 
whole of the relevant stretch of time.  And this is absurd, because by hypothesis I do not 
see that it is brown at the end of the relevant stretch.     
However, there is no need for us to employ this way of understanding the idea of 
being in a position to know, because the absurd conclusion will follow even if we work 
with the way of understanding this idea which McDowell favours.  We need simply to 
imagine our stretch of time between two intervals – at the beginning of which I am seeing 
that your sweater is brown, but at the end of which I am not – and to insist that, for any 
time t, where t is a time during this stretch (including the two intervals), if at t I see that 
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your sweater is brown, then at t I believe that I see that your sweater is brown because I 
see that your sweater is brown.
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 For now – on the assumption that t is a time during the 
relevant stretch (including the two intervals) – the luminosity claim that, for any time t, if 
at t I see that your sweater is brown then at t I am in a position to know that I see that 
your sweater is brown, will, once again, entail the super-luminosity claim that, for any 
time t, if at t I see that your sweater is brown then at t I know that I see that your sweater 
is brown.  So, it will still follow – given the reliability principle – that I see that your 
sweater is brown during the whole of the relevant stretch of time.  And this is absurd, 
because by hypothesis I do not see that your sweater is brown at the end of the stretch.      
Once disabused both of the illusion that the anti-luminosity argument does not 
touch McDowell‟s luminosity claim but merely the super-luminosity claim, and of the 
related illusion that it will not touch the former once the idea of being in a position to 
know is understood in the way McDowell recommends, suspicion naturally falls onto the 
reliability principle – and indeed this has been the standard target for suspicion.19  
There is no space here for a full-scale defence of this principle (and I would not 
know how to provide one even if there was).  But I think there is a ladder of thought, 
leading all the way up to this principle, which is sufficiently appealing that any argument 
for rejecting the principle, no matter how compelling, will seem to land one in the 
dialectically unattractive position of denying one of the steps in this ladder.  
The following constitutes a seemingly general requirement on knowledge: if one 
knows that something is the case, then one believes that it is the case because it is the 
case – where the „because‟ is the „because‟ of some species of causal explanation.  This 
requirement appears, in the case of perceptual knowledge, in the form of the thought that 
if one knows (perceptually) that something is the case then one believes that it is the case 
because one perceives that it is the case (and so, because it is the case).  And it appears, in 
the case of knowledge that one perceives that something is the case, in the form of the 
thought that if one knows that one perceives that something is the case then one believes 
that one perceives that it is the case because one perceives that it is the case.  Now it 
seems that, if in one situation something is the case and one believes that it is the case, 
but in a very close situation it is not the case and yet one still believes that it is the case, 
then the claim that, in the former situation, one believes that it is the case because it is the 
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case is in jeopardy.  And if this claim is jeopardised then so is the claim that, in the 
former situation, one knows that it is the case – given the seemingly general requirement 
on knowledge.  So, it seems – given this requirement – that if in one situation one knows 
that something is the case, but in a very close situation this thing is not the case, then in 
this very close situation one does not believe that this thing is the case.       
What is it for two situations to count as being „very close‟?  Well, it seems to be a 
fact about our capacity for altering confidence-levels that we cannot, across a fractionally 
small space of time (say, a single millisecond) shift from a state of believing that 
something is the case with the confidence required for knowing that it is the case, to a 
state of not believing that it is the case.  And here by „our capacity‟ I mean the capacity of 
human beings like us, who are at our current stage of biological development, and who 
maintain their confidence-levels without the benefit of special scientific instrumentation.  
We might cast this fact into hypothetical form by saying that, if at one time one knows 
(and so believes) that something is the case, then at a fractionally later time (say, one 
millisecond later) one still believes that it is the case – other things being equal, of course, 
i.e., so long as one still exists at the later time, and still exists as the ordinary human 
being one is.  Given this, it seems that two situations temporally spaced only fractionally 
(say, one millisecond) apart will always count, for human beings, as being „very close‟, 
no matter how much the situations may differ in other respects.  We can make this point 
vivid – in a way which exploits the principle enunciated at the end of the previous 
paragraph (the principle which seems to flow from the seemingly general requirement on 
knowledge) – by saying that a world in which nothing is the case for any longer than one 
millisecond would be a world in which we cannot know anything.
20
  Things would zip by 
too quickly for us to believe that they are the case because they are the case.  
And with that, we arrive at the anti-luminosity argument‟s reliability principle.  
For when we combine this understanding of the idea of a „very close‟ situation with the 
principle which seems to flow from the general requirement on knowledge, we arrive at 
the principle that if in one situation one knows that something is the case, but in a 
situation temporally spaced only fractionally (say, one millisecond) apart from the former 
situation this thing is not the case, then in the latter situation one does not believe that it is 
the case.  And it follows from the conjunction of this principle, and the hypothetical into 
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which the aforesaid fact about our capacity for altering confidence-levels was cast, that if 
in one situation one knows that something is the case then in a situation temporally 
spaced only fractionally (say, one millisecond) apart from the former situation this thing 
is the case.  In other words, what follows is the reliability principle.
21  
  
So, it seems anyone who disputes the reliability principle of the anti-luminosity 
argument will be in the unattractive position of disputing one of the steps in this ladder of 
thought, be it the seemingly general requirement on knowledge, or the principle which 
seems to flow from this requirement, or the apparent fact about our capacity for altering 
confidence-levels, or the understanding of the idea of a „very close‟ situation which this 
apparent fact seems to entrain.  That is hardly enough to compel acceptance of the 
reliability principle, even when it is understood as a principle which applies merely to the 
knowledge enjoyed by ordinary human beings like us.  But it ought to be enough to 
caution against rejecting the principle – so understood – and, as a result, enough to 
caution against rejecting the anti-luminosity argument to which it is essential.   
 
6.  The upshot is that we have some reason to reject luminosity, and as a result some 
reason to reject McDowell‟s luminosity claim.    
The fact that there is some reason to reject this luminosity claim means there is 
some reason to endorse the disjunctive conception of perceiving.  For if we are to reject 
this claim, we shall need to reject one of the two thoughts which together entail it, i.e., 
either McDowell‟s thought that if I am entitled to believe that P then I am in a position to 
know what entitles me to believe that P, or his thought that if I perceive that P then I am 
entitled to believe that P by the fact that I perceive that P.  The first of these thoughts – 
McDowell‟s anti-externalist, Sellarsian thought – is not in dispute here, because this 
thought is fundamental to McDowell‟s conception of “knowledge – at least as it is 
enjoyed by rational animals – [as] a certain sort of standing in the space of reasons”.  So, 
we shall need to reject the second of these thoughts (given that we reject the luminosity 
claim).  It seems to me that a great strength of the disjunctive conception of perceiving is 
that it enables us to reject this second thought without relinquishing either the first 
thought (the Sellarsian thought), or McDowell‟s contention that – on some occasions – 
one can be entitled to believe that P by the fact that one perceives that P.   
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According to the disjunctive conception, cases of perceiving that P are either 
cases of being in a position to know that one perceives that P, or cases of merely 
perceiving that P.  If one perceives that P, and the case of perceiving that P which one 
enjoys is of the former variety, then one can be entitled to believe that P by the fact that 
one perceives that P, because one is in a position to know that one perceives that P. 
Whereas, if one perceives that P, and the case of perceiving that P which one enjoys is of 
the latter variety, then one cannot be entitled to believe that P by the fact that one 
perceives that P, because one is not in a position to know that one perceives that P.   
It is precisely by allowing for the possibility of merely believing that P that the 
disjunctive conception avoids the luminosity argument.  For given the disjunctive 
conception, the following is possible: at t I know that I see that your sweater is brown, 
and so – given the reliability principle of the anti-luminosity argument – at t+1 I see that 
your sweater is brown; but at t+1 I do not know that I see that your sweater is brown 
(even though at t+1 I believe that I see that your sweater is brown because I see that your 
sweater is brown) precisely because when at t+1 I see that it is brown I merely see that it 
is brown.  No general claim is being made to the effect that, for any time t, if at t I see 
that P then at t I am in a position to know that I see that P.  So, the threat that I will never 
stop seeing that your sweater is brown throughout the relevant stretch of time is no longer 
present.  (If this is not yet clear, just imagine a millisecond in the stretch when the case of 
seeing that your sweater is brown which I enjoy is a case of being in a position to know 
that I see that your sweater is brown.  And assume both McDowell‟s way of 
understanding the idea of being in a position to know, and that whenever I see that your 
sweater is brown I believe that I see that your sweater is brown because I see that your 
sweater is brown.  Given the reliability principle, it follows that at the next millisecond I 
still see that your sweater is brown.  But because the luminosity claim has been replaced 
by the disjunctive conception, it is possible that, at this millisecond, the case of seeing 
that your sweater is brown which I enjoy is a case of merely seeing that your sweater is 
brown, and, consequently, possible that at this millisecond I do not know that I see that 
your sweater is brown.  If this possibility is actualised, then it is not the case, at this 
millisecond, that I know that I see that your sweater is brown, even though it is the case, 
at this millisecond, that I see that your sweater is brown.)  But even though this threat is 
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scotched, neither the Sellarsian thought (i.e., that if I am entitled to believe that P then I 
am in a position to know what entitles me to believe that P) nor the contention that – on 
some occasions – one can be entitled to believe that P by the fact that one perceives that P 
is relinquished.   
 
7.  However, it does seem that the disjunctive conception of perceiving, as it stands, 
leaves us in the dark on a crucial point.  It claims that some cases of perceiving that P are 
cases of being in a position to know that one perceives that P; but it seems not to tell us 
what it is about these cases which makes them cases of being in a position to know that 
one perceives that P.  Put differently, it seems not to tell us what puts one in a position to 
know that one perceives that P (when one is in this position).  It seems merely to tell us 
that some cases of perceiving that P are cases of being in a position to know that one 
perceives that P, without explaining what makes these cases instances of this kind.     
 There are at least two ways of enriching the disjunctive conception so that it 
supplies the needed illumination.  
The first maintains that some cases of perceiving that P are constituted as cases of 
being in a position to know that one perceives that P because of something extrinsic to 
themselves, i.e., because of one‟s possession of a (fallible) capacity to know that one 
perceives that P.  Some cases of perceiving that P count as cases of being in a position to 
know that one perceives that P because, in these cases, one possesses the capacity; 
whereas other cases of perceiving that P count as cases of merely perceiving that P 
because, in these cases, one does not possess the capacity.  So, what puts one in a 
position to know that one perceives that P is not the fact that one perceives that P by 
itself, but this fact against the background of one‟s possession of this capacity.22 
By contrast, the second maintains that some cases of perceiving that P are 
intrinsically cases of being in a position to know that one perceives that P; they are not 
constituted as such cases by something extrinsic to themselves, rather, it is intrinsic to 
them that the subject who enjoys them possesses the capacity to know that they perceive 
that P.  Whereas, on the first enrichment, no case of perceiving that P is intrinsically such 
that one could enjoy it only if one possesses this capacity, on the second enrichment some 
cases of perceiving that P are intrinsically such that one could enjoy them only if one 
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possesses this capacity.  Cases of perceiving that P come in at least two sorts: those 
which are intrinsically cases of being in a position to know that one perceives that P, and 
those which are cases of merely perceiving that P, i.e., cases in which one is not in a 
position to know that one perceives that P.
23
  So, what puts one in a position to know that 
one perceives that P is not the fact that one perceives that P against the background of 
one‟s possession of the capacity, but the fact that one perceives that P by itself – where 
this is a fact to the effect that one enjoys a case of perceiving that P of the first sort.  
Armed with the distinction between these two different enrichments of the 
disjunctive conception of perceiving, the question seems to arise as to which we should 
endorse.  But before turning to that, we need to consider a seemingly more pressing issue.       
 
8.  In §4, I mentioned the worry that there are circumstances in which one can see that P 
without being in a position to know (visually) that P, e.g., barn-façade scenarios.  But 
there will be those who refuse to feel this worry.  There will be those who agree with 
McDowell that the very idea of seeing that P is the idea of being in a position to know 
(visually) that P.
24
  And there will be those who think, contra McDowell, that the idea of 
seeing that P is the idea, not merely of being in a position to know (visually) that P, but of 
knowing (visually) that P.
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  To the latter, much of the foregoing – which has followed 
McDowell in taking seeing that P to fall short of knowing (visually) that P – will have 
seemed rather odd.  But even to the former, the claim that there can be cases of seeing 
that P which are neither cases of knowing (visually) that P, nor cases of being in a 
position to know (visually) that P, will have seemed odd.  (To the latter this claim will 
have seemed odder still.)  And the disjunctive conception entails this claim, given the 
following plausible thoughts, both of which McDowell endorses, and neither of which I 
wish to deny: first, that if I am in a position to know (perceptually) that P then I am 
entitled to believe that P by the fact that I perceive that P; and, secondly, that if I am 
entitled to believe that P by the fact that I perceive that P, then I am in a position to know 
that I perceive that P.  For the disjunctive conception insists that there are cases in which 
I perceive that P but am not in a position to know that I perceive that P (i.e., cases in 
which I merely perceive that P).  So, because I am not in a position to know that I 
perceive that P, in these cases, it follows – given both of the aforesaid plausible thoughts 
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– that, in these cases, I am not in a position to know (perceptually) that P.  And so, it 
follows that there can be (e.g.) cases of seeing that P which are not cases of being in a 
position to know (visually) that P.  And McDowell will find that thought rather odd.   
 This ostensible oddness might seem to put pressure on the disjunctive conception.  
But why not see it instead as putting pressure on McDowell‟s assumption that the 
entitlement which I have, when I enjoy perceptual knowledge, consists in the fact that I 
perceive that P?  I noted (in §2) that this assumption diverges from the policy I adopted in 
§1, of treating this entitlement as consisting in the fact that I perceive such-and-such, 
rather than in the fact that I perceive that P, e.g., in the fact that I perceive a man in front 
of me chewing on his pencil, rather than in the fact that I perceive that there is a man in 
front of me chewing on his pencil.  Perhaps the frame in which the disjunctive conception 
should ideally emerge is one constituted by this policy, rather than by McDowell‟s 
assumption.  This policy does not dispute McDowell‟s central contention that the reason 
required for perceptual knowledge must not fall short of the fact known; e.g., I cannot see 
a man in front of me chewing on the end of his pencil unless there is a man in front of me 
chewing on the end of his pencil.  But replacing McDowell‟s assumption by this policy 
will remove the ostensible oddness attaching to the disjunctive conception of perceiving.   
 To illustrate: if I have perceptual knowledge that your sweater is brown, then I 
have a reason to believe that your sweater is brown, consisting in the fact that I see your 
brown sweater.  Of course, I can see your brown sweater without knowing that your 
sweater is brown.  But, at least from McDowell‟s perspective, this is no objection to 
thinking that the fact that I see your brown sweater cannot be an entitlement, or a reason, 
which I have to believe that your sweater is brown.  And this is because – for McDowell 
– I can see that your sweater is brown without knowing that your sweater is brown, 
precisely because I am in what Kern calls “reflectively unfavourable circumstances” (see 
§3).  What is more, it does not follow from the fact that I can see your brown sweater 
without being in a position to know that your sweater is brown that the fact that I see your 
brown sweater cannot function as a reason for me to believe that your sweater is brown.  
We just need to insist that in order for it to function as such a reason I need to be in a 
position to know that I see your brown sweater.  For if I am in a position to know that I 
see your brown sweater, how can I fail to be in a position to know that your sweater is 
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brown?  From the mere fact that I see your brown sweater it may not follow that I am in a 
position to know that your sweater is brown.  But if this fact functions as a reason which I 
have to believe that your sweater is brown, then it does follow that I am in this position.   
 The general idea is that, if I enjoy perceptual knowledge that P, then I believe that 
P for a reason consisting in the fact that I perceive such-and-such – where what replaces 
„such-and-such‟ suitably matches what replaces „P‟.  There is probably no principle the 
application of which unfailingly guarantees the presence of a suitable match here.  But 
the following seems a good rule of thumb: take the proposition which replaces „P‟, and 
remove its marks of proposition-hood, such as its quantifiers and its logical connectives; 
e.g., if what replaces „P‟ is the proposition there is a man in front of me, then what 
replaces „such-and-such‟ will be a man in front of me.  (Subtlety may be required when 
applying this rule; e.g., if what replaces „P‟ is your sweater is brown, what replaces 
„such-and-such‟ will be your brown sweater; whereas, if what replaces „P‟ is that parrot 
is dead, what replaces „such-and-such‟ will be a dead parrot.)    
 For this suggestion to be defensible we need some idea about what puts one in a 
position to know that one perceives such-and-such, when one is in this position.  And 
here the disjunctive conception of perceiving can do its work – where this is understood 
not as the disjunctive conception of perceiving that P, but as the disjunctive conceptions 
of perceiving such-and-such.  (And in doing this work it can seem to suggest an answer 
to the question raised at the close of §7, i.e., it can seem to suggest that we should 
endorse the extrinsic rather than the intrinsic enrichment.)  
 The disjunctive conception of perceiving such-and-such – on both its intrinsic and 
its extrinsic enrichments – maintains that cases of perceiving such-and-such either supply 
one with a reason consisting in the fact that one perceives such-and-such, because they 
are cases of being in a position to know that one perceives such-and-such, or supply one 
with a reason consisting in the fact that one seems to perceive such-and-such, because 
they are cases of merely perceiving such-and-such, i.e., cases of perceiving such-and-
such which are not cases of being in a position to know that one perceives such-and-such.   
The extrinsic enrichment maintains that what puts one in the relevant position is 
the fact that one perceives such-and-such together with one‟s possession of an epistemic 
capacity, which we can specify as the capacity to tell that what one perceives is such-and-
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such; e.g., the capacity to tell that what one perceives is your brown sweater.  Putting it 
like that brings out how this is a capacity at once to know one‟s reason to believe that P 
and to know perceptually that P, e.g., at once to know that one perceives your brown 
sweater, and to know perceptually that your sweater is brown.  For if I can tell that I 
perceive your brown sweater, how can I fail to be in a position to know that your sweater 
is brown?  That one possesses this capacity is not guaranteed by the fact that one 
perceives such-and-such.  But if one perceives such-and-such, and one possesses this 
capacity, then one is in a position to know (e.g.) that one perceives such-and-such.
26
   
 According to the intrinsic enrichment, by contrast, that one possesses the capacity 
to tell that what one perceives is such-and-such is guaranteed by the fact that one 
perceives such-and-such – where this is a fact to the effect that the case of perceiving 
such-and-such which one enjoys is of the first rather than the second of the following 
sorts.  For cases of perceiving such-and-such come in at least two sorts: some are 
intrinsically cases of being in a position to know that one perceives such-and-such (for it 
is intrinsic to them that one possesses the capacity to tell that what one perceives is such-
and-such); whereas others are cases of merely perceiving such-and-such. 
 It should be clear that, unlike the disjunctive conception of perceiving that P, 
which did entail the ostensibly odd thought that one can (e.g.) see that P without being in 
a position to know (visually) that P, the new disjunctive conception of perceiving such-
and-such does not carry this entailment (regardless of whether it is enriched in the 
extrinsic or the intrinsic direction).  For consider the following two plausible thoughts, 
cousins of the two plausible thoughts mentioned in the first paragraph of this section: 
first, if one is in a position to know perceptually that P then one is entitled to believe that 
P by the fact that one perceives such-and-such; secondly, if one is entitled to believe that 
P by the fact that one perceives such-and-such then one is in a position to know that one 
perceives such-and-such (where, in each case, what replaces „such-and-such‟ suitably 
matches what replaces „P‟).  Given these plausible thoughts, the new disjunctive 
conception entails that there are cases in which one perceives such-and-such but is not in 
a position to know (perceptually) that P.  But there is nothing even ostensibly odd about 
this thought.  (The thought that I can (e.g.) see a man in front of me, but not be in a 
position to know (visually) that there is a man in front of me is routine.)  What is more, 
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there is no obvious route from this thought to the ostensibly odd thought that one can 
perceive that P but not be in a position to know (perceptually) that P.  Indeed, it seems 
that, now that we have replaced the disjunctive conception of perceiving that P with the 
disjunctive conception of perceiving such-and-such, we are free to use the idea of 
perceiving that P either in such a way that if one perceives that P then one actually knows 
(perceptually) that P, or in such a way that if one perceives that P then one is in a position 
to know (perceptually) that P.  Nothing in the new disjunctive conception of perceiving 
such-and-such, even when it is conjoined with some or even all of the aforesaid plausible 
thoughts,  will prevent one from using the idea of perceiving that P in either of these 
ways.   
 However, there can seem to be a problem with the intrinsic enrichment of the new 
disjunctive conception of perceiving.  In insisting that some facts to the effect that one 
perceives such-and-such guarantee that one possesses the relevant epistemic capacity, the 
intrinsic enrichment does not contradict the obvious point that I can (e.g.) see your brown 
sweater without being in a position to know that I see your brown sweater, because it 
allows for other facts to this effect which do not guarantee this (because, e.g., they are 
facts to the effect that one enjoys a case of perceiving such-and-such which is in fact a 
case of merely perceiving such-and-such).  But it can be tempting to move from this 
obvious point to the distinct – but, for some it seems, no less obvious – point that no fact 
to the effect that one perceives such-and-such can entail that one possesses the capacity to 
know that one perceives such-and-such.  Facts to the effect that one perceives that P 
guarantee that one possesses the capacity to know perceptually that P; but facts to the 
effect that one perceives such-and-such are different, because – unlike cases of 
perceiving that P – cases of perceiving such-and-such are non-epistemic, i.e., no such 
case is intrinsically an opportunity to know anything; and so, no such case is something 
to which the possession of an epistemic capacity is intrinsic.
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 The intrinsic enrichment sets its face against this supposedly obvious point.  This 
might seem to show that we should reject this way of enriching the disjunctive 
conception.  But that might be too quick.  I do not propose to settle this matter here.  But 
I want to end by showing that in this respect the intrinsic enrichment is in line with a 
recent thought of McDowell‟s, which rejects the very idea of non-epistemic seeing.   
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9.  In a recent essay, McDowell (2008) insists that seeing such-and-such – as it is enjoyed 
by rational animals – requires the possession of suitable conceptual capacities on the part 
of the perceiving subject; specifically, conceptual capacities associated with concepts of 
“proper sensibles of sight and common sensibles accessible to sight” (260) – concepts of 
(e.g.) colours, and shapes.  This is required to ensure that cases of seeing such-and-such 
are intrinsically opportunities to know that what one sees exhibits certain sensibles.  
Which sensibles these are depends not just on which sensibles are exhibited by what one 
sees but on which conceptual capacities are drawn into operation in the case of seeing 
which one enjoys.  The idea is that a case of seeing something which exhibits a certain 
sensible, in which the conceptual capacity associated with the concept of this sensible is 
suitably drawn into operation, is intrinsically an opportunity to know that what one sees 
exhibits this sensible.  It is taken for granted that, in every case of seeing, some 
conceptual capacities associated with concepts of the relevant sensibles are suitably 
drawn into operation.  And it is taken for granted that the fact that such-and-such 
conceptual capacities are suitably operative, in a particular case of seeing, is itself an 
intrinsic feature of the case of seeing in question.   
Insisting on these points is consistent with denying (as McDowell does deny) that 
cases of seeing are intrinsically opportunities to know more sophisticated things.  E.g., no 
case of seeing your brown sweater is intrinsically an opportunity to know that I see your 
brown sweater; my being in a position to know that always requires the extrinsic 
presence of the capacity to tell that what I see is your sweater.  However, he thinks that 
my being in a position to know that I see something brown need not require the extrinsic 
presence of the capacity to tell that what I see is something brown; I could be in that 
position simply by seeing (e.g.) your brown sweater, so long as when I do the conceptual 
capacity associated with the concept brown is suitably drawn into operation.   
What we have here is a glimpse of a disjunctive conception of perceiving (or at 
least, a disjunctive conception of seeing), enriched in the intrinsic way.  Some cases of 
seeing something brown are intrinsically cases in which the conceptual capacity 
associated with the concept brown is suitably drawn into operation, whereas other cases 
of seeing something brown are not intrinsically cases in which the conceptual capacity 
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associated with this concept is suitably operative.  The former are intrinsically cases of 
being in a position to know that one sees something brown.  The latter need not be cases 
of merely seeing something brown; but if they are cases of being in a position to know 
that one sees something brown, the reason why they possess this status must be different 
from the reason why this status is possessed by cases of the former sort.  
Of course, we do not arrive at a disjunctive conception of seeing such-and-such 
until we insist on there being cases of merely seeing such-and-such.  Nothing in 
McDowell‟s recent thought shows that he endorses such a conception.  (This is why I 
only said that what we have here is a glimpse of a disjunctive conception of seeing.)  But 
it seems that McDowell ought to allow for cases of merely seeing something brown, so as 
to avoid another luminosity claim, i.e., the claim that if one sees something brown then 
one is in a position to know that one sees something brown.  And what goes for 
brownness goes for every other sensible which one can see.  
 So, if McDowell‟s recent thought is on the right lines, then, on pain of the anti-
luminosity argument, he has reason to endorse the disjunctive conception of perceiving, 
on its intrinsic enrichment, for cases of seeing something which exhibits a certain 
sensible.  That is, he has reason to think that such cases come in at least two sorts: those 
which are intrinsically cases of being in a position to know that one sees something 
exhibiting the relevant sensible (because the relevant conceptual capacities are suitably 
drawn into operation), and those which are cases of merely seeing something exhibiting 
the relevant sensible.  But for all his recent thought has to say, the disjunctive conception, 
on its extrinsic enrichment, can apply to cases of seeing, e.g., your brown sweater.  
Whether his recent thought is on the right lines is a topic for a different essay (although I 
happen to think it is).  The aim, at this late stage, is merely to present a consideration – 
arising from McDowell‟s own writings – which tells in favour of the intrinsic enrichment 
of the disjunctive conception, at least for some cases of seeing such-and-such.    
   
10.  We are now in a position to express the disjunctive conception of perceiving as 
follows: cases of perceiving such-and-such can either supply one with a reason consisting 
in the fact that one perceives such-and-such, because they are – perhaps intrinsically, or 
perhaps extrinsically – cases of being in a position to know that one perceives such-and-
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such, or supply one with a reason consisting merely in the fact that one seems to perceive 
such-and-such, because they are cases of merely perceiving such-and-such, i.e., cases in 
which, though one perceives such-and-such, one is not in a position to know one does so.  
 This way of putting things enables us to press the question of the relation between 
the disjunctive conception of perceiving and McDowell‟s original disjunctive conception 
of experience; specifically, whether the former should be thought to supplement, or to 
supplant the latter.  The latter says that experience can supply one with a reason 
consisting either in the fact that one perceives such-and-such, or merely in the fact that 
one seems to do so.  I suggest that we think of the disjunctive conception of perceiving as 
offering an account of what it is for one‟s experience actually to supply one with the 
former reason, i.e., it is not enough for one‟s experience to be a case of perceiving such-
and-such; it must be a case of perceiving such-and-such of a certain sort, one which is – 
be it intrinsically, or extrinsically – a case of being in a position to know that one 
perceives such-and-such, as opposed to (what I call) a case of mere perceiving.  That is 
the nub of the conception which it has been my aim to recommend in this essay. 
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Notes  
1.  Here I follow John McDowell‟s presentation of this variant, in his 1982.      
2.  For an extended defence of this way of understanding McDowell, see Haddock and 
Macpherson 2008a.  
3.  See especially Martin 2002, and many of the essays collected in the first part of Haddock 
and Macpherson 2008b.  
4.  As far as I am aware, Alex Byrne and Heather Logue were the first clearly to distinguish 
between epistemological and metaphysical versions of the disjunctive conception of 
experience; see their 2008.  See also Millar 2007.   
5.  This is Martin‟s view. For a comprehensive discussion, see Soteriou 2009.   
6.  By way of doing even more to distance McDowell‟s disjunctive conception from the  
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metaphysical disjunctive conception, let me note that, even though McDowell makes use 
of the idea of experiences which are „just like‟ one another, it is not obvious that this idea 
must be understood in terms either of the idea of sameness of phenomenology, or in 
terms of the idea of what is knowable by introspection alone.  McDowell (2006a) 
remarks that even though “the claim that from a subject‟s point of view, a misleading 
experience can be indistinguishable from a case in which things are as they appear … 
might be taken as a self-standing claim about the phenomenology of misleading 
appearance, available to be cited in explaining the fact that subjects can be misled by 
appearances … the right way to take it is as registering the fact that, on that 
interpretation, it is supposed to explain: the undeniable fact that our capacity to get to 
know things through perception is fallible” (231).  I will say more about the idea of a 
fallible capacity to know things through perception as I proceed.  But for now the point to 
note is that to say that my experience in the good case is „just like‟ my experience in the 
bad case might be merely to say that it can be reasonable for me to take it that my 
experience is good (e.g., I am seeing a man chewing on his pencil) when in fact my 
experience is bad (e.g., I am hallucinating such a man).  Perhaps the notions of 
introspection and phenomenology need not figure in the epistemological disjunctive 
conception. 
7.  Because it is often missed; for some relevant discussion, see Neta and Pritchard 2007. 
8.  Here McDowell differs from those philosophers – e.g., Tyler Burge, and Alvin Plantinga 
– who put some of these notions (e.g., the notions of entitlement and justification, in 
Burge‟s case, and the notions of warrant and justification, in Plantinga‟s) to specific, 
technical uses.  There is a useful remark on one instance of this technical tendency in 
McDowell 2006b, 132, n. 4.     
9.  An apparent exception is McDowell 2008, to be discussed in §9 below.  
10.  We arrive at least at this claim.  There are two ways to understand the Sellarsian thought  
which are relevant in the present context: as the thought that if I am entitled to believe 
that P by the fact that Q then I am in a position to know that Q; and, as the thought that if 
I am entitled to believe that P by the fact that Q then I am in a position to know that I am 
entitled to believe that P by the fact that Q.  If we understand it in the first way, then we 
arrive precisely at this claim.  But if we understand it in the second way, then we arrive at 
the stronger claim that if I am entitled to believe that P by the fact that I perceive that P 
then I am in a position to know that I am entitled to believe that P by the fact that I 
perceive that P.  (That is stronger because the truth of its consequent entails but is not 
 28 
entailed by the fact that I am in a position to know that I perceive that P.)  For my 
purposes, it is enough that the Sellarsian thought enables us to arrive at the weaker claim; 
so, I propose to understand this thought in the first rather than the second of these ways.    
11.  A forerunner of the disjunctive conception of perceiving that P may be found in my 
contribution to Pritchard, Millar, and Haddock 2010.  I think that many, if not all, of the 
claims which I make in this contribution, by means of this disjunctive conception of 
perceiving, can be made just as well – if not better – by means of the disjunctive 
conception of perceiving such-and-such which I sketch here.    
12.  More precisely, if one is in a position to know (perceptually) that P because one perceives 
that P, then one knows (perceptually) that P if, and only if, one believes that P because 
one perceives that P – where that „because‟ is the „because‟ of the appropriate species of 
causal explanation.   
13.  More precisely, if one is in a position to know that one perceives that P because one 
perceives that P, then one knows that one perceives that P if, and only if, one believes 
that one perceives that P because one perceives that P – where that „because‟ is the 
„because‟ of the appropriate species of causal explanation.  
14.  Where the „because‟ is the „because‟ of the appropriate species of causal explanation.  
15.  Where the „because‟ is the „because‟ of the appropriate species of causal explanation.  
16.  I mention this worry because I know that it moves some people, and for this reason hope 
that it might do something at least to begin to make clear the attractions of the disjunctive 
conception of perceiving.   
17.  The argument is due to Williamson 2000.  Soteriou (2009, §3.2) seems to me to go wrong 
in supposing that McDowell‟s (1986) claim that there are some facts about one‟s mind 
which one can know only fallibly is of a piece with Williamson‟s opposition to 
luminosity.  For one thing, things which are only fallibly knowable might still be 
luminous.  For another, Williamson thinks that (modulo some exceptions which are 
irrelevant for present purposes) nothing is luminous, whereas it seems that McDowell 
disagrees.   
18.  Where the „because‟ is the „because‟ of the appropriate species of causal explanation.  
19.  See, e.g., Neta and Rohrbaugh 2004.    
20.  Or at least, a world in which we cannot know anything which we can know to be the case 
only if we can believe that it is the case because it is the case – where the „because‟ is the 
„because‟ of some species of causal explanation.  
 29 
21.  It might help to spell out more explicitly why this follows.  Assume that t and t+1 are two 
times spaced one millisecond apart, and that „C‟ refers to some specific thing which can 
be the case.  And grant (1) if at t one knows that C is the case, and at t+1 C is not the 
case, then at t+1 one does not believe that C is the case (i.e., grant the principle which 
seems to follow from the seemingly general requirement on knowledge, fleshed out in 
line with the present understanding of the idea of being „very close‟); and, (2) if at t one 
knows that C is the case then at t+1 one believes that C is the case (i.e., the hypothetical 
which purports to capture the putative fact about our capacity for altering confidence-
levels).  Now assume (3) at t one knows that C is the case.  It follows from 2 and 3 that 
(4) at t+1 one believes that C is the case.  And it follows from 1 and 4 that (5) either at t 
one does not know that C is the case, or at t+1 C is the case.  And it follows from 3 and 5, 
that (6) at t+1 C is the case.  So, it follows from 1 and 2 that (7) if at t one knows that C is 
the case then at t+1 C is the case.  In other words, the reliability principle follows from 1 
and 2.   
22.  This claim will not lead to luminosity, given the disjunctive conception‟s insistence that 
the capacity at issue is a capacity one can lose even as one continues to perceive; e.g., a 
stretch of time in which I still see that your sweater is brown, but in which your sweater 
is slowly starting to look a different colour (because the dodgy lights are slowly turning 
on) can be one in which, at some time during it, I have lost this capacity, and so am not in 
a position to know that I see that your sweater is brown, even though I am still seeing that 
your sweater is brown (fractionally later, I will stop seeing that it is brown).    
23.  The reason why I do not formulate this second, intrinsic, enrichment as an exclusive 
disjunction – i.e., simply as the claim that cases of perceiving that P are either 
intrinsically cases of being in a position to know that one perceives that P, or cases of 
merely perceiving that P – is because if I did then I would rule out those cases of 
perceiving that P which are extrinsically cases of being in a position to know that one 
perceives that P.  This point should be borne in mind, even though it will not be made a 
topic of discussion in what follows. 
24.  Rödl (2007, chapter 7) seems to be an example.   
25.  Williamson (2000, chapter 1) seems to be an example.  
26.  This claim will not lead to luminosity, given the disjunctive conception‟s insistence that 
the capacity at issue is a capacity one can lose even as one continues to perceive; e.g., a 
stretch of time in which I still see your brown sweater but in which it is slowly starting to 
look a different colour can be one in which, at some time during it, I have lost this 
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capacity, and so am not in a position to know that I see your brown sweater, even though 
I am still seeing your brown sweater (fractionally later, I will stop seeing it).    
27.  We seem to find a conception of perceiving such-and-such which is non-epistemic in this 
sense in Travis 2004.   
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